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From Kantian schematism to the system of experience’s invariants: the 
coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects in Cassirer’s philosophy 
 
Summary 
This paper analyzes Cassirer‟s account of the coordination of concepts and spatio-
temporal objects. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, Cassirer 
maintains that this coordination is not achieved by means of a third element (the schema), 
which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible. Rather, in Cassirer‟s view, the 
coordination will take place through a specification of the concepts that should be sought 
“within the domain of concepts itself.” 
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Introduction 
It has been argued recently that the key to solving many interpretation problems of 
the Kantian doctrine of schematism is to determine correctly the object that is to be 
subsumed under categories by means of schemata. More precisely, it has been maintained 
that this object is not merely an appearance taken as an object in general, but an appearance 
considered as a concrete, empirically given object. From this viewpoint, the proper task of 





 The aim of this paper is to analyze an alternative 
proposal to the Kantian solution of the coordination problem, which can be found in Ernst 
Cassirer‟s philosophy. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, 
Cassirer maintains that the coordination of concepts and objects is not achieved by means 
of a third element (the schema), which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible.
2
  
Rather, in Cassirer‟s view, the coordination will take place through a specification of the 
concepts that should be sought “within the domain of concepts itself.”3 
The thread that will enable us to reconstruct Cassirer‟s argumentation will be his 
interpretation of the causality principle. We shall see that this principle is the ultimate 
condition upon which the possibility of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal 
objects depends.   
The structure of the paper will be the following. We shall begin by discussing the general 
framework of Cassirer‟s investigations on the causality principle. This is the framework 
provided by the transcendental method (§1). Then, we shall analyze the problems that 
Cassirer finds in the Kantian doctrine of causality, in particular regarding the schematism of 
that category, once the transcendental method is assumed (§2). Later, we shall discuss the 
main structure of the system of physical knowledge, for it is within this system that 
concepts and spatio-temporal objects get coordinated (§3). Finally, we shall investigate the 
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transcendental role that Cassirer assigns to the causality principle, and we shall show how 
this principle makes the coordination of concepts and objects in the system of physical 
knowledge first possible (§4). 
 §1 Cassirer and the transcendental method 
The Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school conceives itself as Kantian not 
regarding the content of its philosophy but rather regarding the form of its philosophizing. 
Neo-Kantians stress that they do not accept dogmatically any result of the Kantian doctrine. 




According to the transcendental method, philosophy should take a certain factum as the 
starting point for the reflection and proceed to seek the possibility conditions of that fact. In 
the case of theoretical philosophy, the fact to be considered is experience. But experience is 
identified with physico-mathematical science. In this sense, Hermann Cohen maintains that 
experience is given in mathematics and in pure natural science,
5
 and, more precisely, in 
Newtonian science.
6
 The task of transcendental philosophy, as a theory of experience, will 
be then to determine the conditions of possibility of Newtonian science.
7
 
Cassirer adopts this Cohenian conception of the transcendental method. But, while Kant 
took as a fact the science of his time, Cassirer applies this method to the new facta provided 
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by the progress of physico-mathematical sciences, which include, in particular, non-
Euclidean geometry and the relativity and quantum theories. In this way, Cassirer thinks 
that, starting with Kantian presuppositions, it is possible and even necessary to take the 
philosophical investigation beyond the stage reached by Kant himself. This progress, 
Cassirer remarks, is just the reaffirmation of the spirit of Kantian philosophy, since “the 
purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason was not to ground philosophical knowledge once 
for all in a fixed dogmatic system of concepts, but to open up for it the „continuous 
development of a science‟; in which there can be only relative, not absolute, stopping 
points.”8 
Cassirer discusses the role of the causality principle in the framework provided by such an 
analysis of the possibility conditions of the new scientific facts, according to the 
transcendental method. In the next section we shall consider the problems that Cassirer 
finds in the Kantian interpretation of that principle. 
§2 Cassirer on Kantian causality 
Cassirer maintains: “Of all the various explanations of the causal concept offered in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, perhaps the most precise and most satisfying is the one in 
which it is said that the concept represents nothing but a direction for the formulation of 
definite empirical concepts.”9 At this point, Cassirer quotes the following passage of the 
first critique: “That everything that happens has a cause cannot be inferred merely from the 
concept of happening in general; on the contrary, it is this fundamental proposition which 
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shows how in regard to that which happens we are in a position to obtain in experience any 
concept whatsoever that is really determinate.”10 The causality principle is a rule that 
indicates how we should conceive and form our concepts in order that they can fulfill their 
transcendental task: that of turning mere appearances into objective knowledge.
11
 Thus, the 
causality principle is a principle about cognitions and not about things or events.
12
 Even 
though in our everyday use of the principle we identify things as causes and effects, such a 
use is misleading if we are looking for a scientific foundation of causality. For what we call 
thing in our everyday experience is a complex of conditions that should be analyzed until 
the authentic scientific causal judgments are reached.
13
 Such a characterization of thing as a 
complex of conditions expresses the core of Kant‟s doctrine, according to which the 
concepts of lawlikeness (Gesetzlichkeit) and objectivity are connected in a synthetic a 
priori judgment: only by means of a lawlike ordering can appearances be referred to an 
object of experience. In this sense, Cassirer indicates: “Objectivity or objective reality, is 
attained only because and insofar as there is conformity to law –not vice versa.”14 
Therefore, we do not cognize objects, as if they (logically) preceded their laws, but rather 
by means of these laws we cognize objectively, as far as we establish certain limits and 
permanent connections in the uniform course of experience.
15
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However, Cassirer maintains, in the deduction of the causality principle carried out in the 
second analogy of experience, Kant wrongly directs his inquiry to empirical things and 
events, instead of exclusively focusing on empirical knowledge.
16
 According to Cassirer, 
Kant rightly maintains the logical preeminence of the concept of law upon the concept of 
object, but the implications of such Copernican inversion are not fully assumed by the 
Kantian analysis of the causality principle. Here, Kant still struggles against representations 
of things and substances, as though a causal connection could be established by merely 
considering successive states of the same thing and determining the earlier as cause of the 
later.
17
 Thus, following the example used by Kant, the objective series of a boat going 
down the river should not be established, for Cassirer, simply by determining the upstream 
state of the boat as the cause of its downstream state. Rather, the determination of the 
objective series requires considering the forces at issue and, more precisely, the physical 
laws (of gravitation, hydrodynamics and hydrostatics) that govern the movement of the 
boat. According to Cassirer, “these laws are the real components of the assumed causal 
connection.”18 In doing this, however, difficulties appear, since the exact formulation of 
those laws demands the symbolic language of physics, which differs significantly from the 
language of “things.”19 The determination of the transcendental role of causality as a 
condition of the possibility of scientific knowledge requires an analysis much more precise 
than the one carried out by Kant in the second analogy of experience. In particular, it is 
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necessary to give up any consideration of “things and events” and the underlying concept of 
substance in order to focus on the functional form of experience. For this reason, Cassirer 
criticizes Kant and declares: “Kant did not follow to the end the road which he took in his 
solution of the Humean problem.” 20 
Cassirer shares the Kantian position concerning the dependence of the concept of object on 
the concept of law, but he rejects the way in which Kant describes the proper role of the 
causality principle, for Kant then seems to invert the direction of the dependence. In fact, 
one might think that Kant initially assumes certain states of an object (like the upstream and 
downstream states of the boat) which then in a second move are represented in a causal 
relationship in order to determine their temporal order. However, this reconstruction of 
Kant‟s argument would not be correct. Rather, for Kant, it is precisely the causality 
principle that enables an objective determination according to the concept of law: the 
principle of causality determines the objective series of experience by means of a lawlike 
connection of successive appearances. In contradistinction to what Cassirer suggests, 
Kant‟s argument tries to show that only the representation of a law of my subjective 
perceptions enables their objective reference. Accordingly, the upstream and downstream 
states of the boat are represented as objective states only with the application of the 
principle of causality. Thus, Kant maintains the dependence of the concept of object on the 
concept of law in his analysis of causality. 
However, according to Cassirer, Kant‟s position still has another shortcoming. The mere 
thought of lawlikeness, which for Cassirer expresses the core of the concept of causality, 
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leaves indeterminate how this conformity to law is to be empirically realized. Therefore, 
Cassirer says, Kant stresses that the category of causality should be specified in order to be 
useful and applied to experience.
21
 This specification is achieved by means of the 
transcendental schematism. It is precisely this doctrine that explains how categories (in 
particular causality) may be applied to empirical phenomena. But, according to Cassirer, 
the validity of Kantian schematism is confined to the framework of Euclidean geometry 
and Newtonian mechanics. Therefore, Cassirer points out: “it is precisely these schemata 
which have lost their universal significance through the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometry on the hand and the results of the special and general relativity theories on the 
other.”22 In the same sense, Cassirer maintains that the “crisis of causality” produced by 
quantum physics is not a crisis of the concept of cause, but rather a crisis of the way in 
which that concept is empirically applied through schemata. Thus, “such schematization 
has been definitely limited through the advent of the quantum theory. We can no longer 
combine causality with space-time description, let alone amalgamate the two in the manner 
of classical physics.”23 
Nevertheless, Cassirer indicates, Kant himself presents a version of the causality principle 
in which the latter remains free from the conditions imposed by schematism.
24
 This is the A 
version of the principle, that reads: “Everything that happens, that is begins to be, 
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presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule.”25 In Cassirer‟s opinion, 
this formulation solely demands the possibility of connecting through rules that which 
happens, without presupposing anything about those rules. Causality just implies the mere 
conformity of natural events to law. But, in the proof of the causality principle, Kant takes a 
further step by introducing time through the schema of cause and effect. Finally, Kant 
relates causality and continuity. The cause does not produce the effect instantaneously, but 
in a certain time interval tb – ta, such that a real magnitude b-a increases through all its 
intermediate degrees from its initial value a in ta to its final value b in tb.
26
 However, 
quantum theory rejects this continuity requirement by accepting that certain magnitudes 
may only have discrete values and vary from an initial to a final value without adopting the 
intermediate ones. Therefore, the connection between causality and continuity, as Kant 
understands it, should be abandoned. 
Given this criticism of Kantian schemata, one might well expect that Cassirer would search 
for new transcendental schemata that could perform the task that the Kantian ones, 
dependent on an earlier stage of science, are no longer able to carry out. However, 
Cassirer‟s proposal is much more radical. The new scientific facts, upon which a 
philosophical investigation carried out according to the transcendental method finally rests, 
demand a reinterpretation of the whole problem of Kantian schematism. In this sense, 
Cassirer maintains: “Transcendental logic can thus no longer be connected with or be 
dependent on transcendental aesthetics, as was the case in Kant‟s system. The demanded 
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specialization, indispensable for the empirical use of the causal concept, must now be 
looked for within the domain of concepts itself.”27  
In the next section we shall see that the conformity to law required by the principle of 
causality does not get specified by means of non-conceptual conditions. Rather, Cassirer 
puts forward a mere logical specification achieved in a system of invariants of experience.  
§3 Physical knowledge as a system of invariants 
Cassirer conceives physics as a system in which three types of statements are to be 




The statements of measurement results are the first step of the transition from the world of 
senses to the world of physics. This step is characterized by the conversion of sense data 
into determinations that may be subsumed under mathematical concepts. That which is 
perceived is represented in terms of measure and number and the immediate sense 
apprehension leaves its place to experimental observation.  
From the point of view of the extension of knowledge, the statements of measurement 
results constitute a clear progress, because by means of measurement instruments it is 
possible to go beyond the contingent limits of our senses, as we do when we study, e.g., the 
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lunar surface with a telescope or blood cells with a microscope. However, this extension is 
not the key point at issue here. In parallel to an expansion of our world image, a 
concentration takes place too. The variety of sensible qualities leaves its place to a few 
fundamental determinations, from which the richness of the sensible data should be 
explained. 
This concentration makes a crucial modification of our knowledge possible. Multiple 
perceptions just make up an aggregate: the sensible qualities of a perceived thing are 
merely juxtaposed. Color, smell, flavor and texture of an apple are independent from each 
other. Any combination of these qualities may contingently take place. Unlike a mere 
aggregate, the properties of a physical object, such as, e.g., and ideal gas, are organized into 
a system. Thus, the modification of one property entails the modification of the rest of 
them. In this way, temperature, pressure and volume of the gas are not independent 
properties, but rather their values are interconnected in a necessary manner.  
Such relationships between the properties of a physical object are expressed by a different 
type of statement: the statements of laws. Whereas the statements of measurement results 
are characterized by an unavoidable reference to a “here and now,” law statements have the 
logical form “if, then.” Accordingly, a law statement cannot be taken as a mere summary of 
a number of statements of measurement results. Laws do not connect in a hypothetical 
manner individual magnitudes to which we may ascribe a spatio-temporal index. Rather, 
laws relate classes of magnitudes. For this reason, the statements of laws are not reached by 
means of an (always controvertible) inductive inference that, starting from many cases, 
12 
 
aims at their totality. To the contrary, in a law statement the “here and know” viewpoint is 
completely abandoned and the representation of a necessary connection is reached.  
However, the transition from statements of measurement results to statements of laws is not 
the end stage in the process of physical knowledge. For just as the multiplicity of properties 
of a physical object acquires unity through laws, these laws are in turn unified by means of 
principles. Such unification is accordingly expressed by a third type of statement: the 
statements of principles. While the statements of measurement results are individual and 
the statements of laws are general, the statements of principles are universal. These 
statements do not refer to individual magnitudes or classes of magnitudes, but they connect 
different domains of physical knowledge, such as optics, mechanics or electrodynamics. 
The differentiation of these domains is thought of as relative to the higher principle, which 
therefore grounds the differentiation and, at the same time, unifies the domains.
29
 Physics 
does not stop in front of the multiplicity of its laws, but seeks rules that enable the 
transition from one law to another. These rules are principles. Examples of them are 
Carnot‟s principle, the principle of energy conservation and the principle of least action, to 
which we shall immediately return.  
The different types of statements are invariants of different order.
30
 The statements of 
measurement results express values of physical magnitudes that do not depend on the 
subjectivity of the one carrying out the measurement. For example, in the same place and at 
the same moment, one observer may be warm, while a second one is cold. In each case, the 
                                                          
29
 Cassirer (1956), p. 44.  
30
 On this issue, see: Ihmig (2001), pp. 81 ff. Ihmig develops in extenso Cassirer‟s theory of experience‟s 
invariants in: Ihmig (1995). See also Ihmig (1996). 
13 
 
perception has only subjective validity, varying from observer to observer. To the contrary, 
the statement of measurement result that expresses the room temperature remains invariant, 
since it is the same for all observers.  
However, even though the temperature value is invariant in this sense, the statement of 
measurement result contains a spatio-temporal index: temperature has the value T in place 
x at time t. When knowledge progresses from statements of measurement results to law 
statements, this index disappears. A law statement does not include the particular 
temperature value in a certain place at a certain moment, as would be the case if a law were 
nothing more than a condensed expression of a collection of statements of measurement 
results. Rather, temperature is present in the law as a magnitude class that gets connected 
with other classes in a way that is invariant regarding the values of those magnitudes at 
different times and in different places. For example, the laws of Boyle, Mariotte and Gay 
Lussac connect temperature, pressure and volume of an ideal gas according to a rule 
independently of the absolute values of the spatio-temporal coordinates.
31
  
But, as we have seen, the multiplicity of laws is to be distinguished from the rule that 
unifies them. In this case, the rule is contained in a statement of principle. Physics 
investigates how different laws, in particular those governing different areas of physics, are 
logically connected to each other. In doing this, the clue is not to be found in the different 
kinds of facts, but on the equations that express the structure of those areas. Cassirer puts 
forward the principle of least action as the paradigmatic example. In its application to 
particular cases, this principle was already known by Heron of Alexandria, who used it to 
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find the reflection laws of light, while Fermat also deduced the law of refraction by means 
of a more extended and deeper version of the principle. Leibniz made use of the principle in 
mechanics and Maupertuis even founded a proof of God‟s existence upon it. Euler gave a 
rigorous formulation and an exact physical meaning to the principle and Lagrange 
presented it in a complete and precise manner. Later, Helmholtz enunciated it as a universal 
physical principle, the validity of which went well beyond mechanics. The principle of least 
action, under the name of Hamilton‟s principle, is now a fundamental principle of modern 
physics, both of relativity and quantum theory.  
The essential feature of the principle of least action is that it is not bound to any 
determinate content, since it is a variational principle. The principle establishes that certain 
magnitudes should have a minimal value, but these magnitudes can be quite diverse, e.g., 
the path covered by light (Heron), the required time for light to cover a path (Fermat), the 
product of velocity and path length (Maupertius), the mean value of potential energy 
(Euler) or the difference between kinetic and potential energy (Hamilton). The demand that 
such magnitudes acquire an extreme value determines the general form of the laws of 
diverse physical disciplines, providing in this way a heuristic rule for the search and 
discovery of such laws. These laws will be multiple, but the principle will remain invariant 
against them. 
The statements of physics join together according to their invariance degree. The 
statements of measurement results are invariant against the subjectivity of the observer. 
Nevertheless, they vary against laws. These laws are in this respect invariant, but they are 
15 
 
not invariant against principles. Rather, principles are invariant against laws, and in being 
so they unify different branches of physics. 
We can therefore see a reciprocal conditioning among statements that provides to the whole 
a systematic character. Neither are laws mere aggregates of measurement results nor are 
principles mere aggregates of laws. Physical knowledge does not originate from “an sich” 
elements, which may have sense and meaning independently of their relationship with 
others and that are accommodated in a kind of knowledge pyramid. Instead, we just find a 
functional coordination, in which all statements take part: the statements of “lower” type 
are entailed and presupposed by those of “higher” type. Thus, the right geometrical symbol 
of the system of physical knowledge would not be a pyramid, but rather a sphere, like the 
one that Parmenides uses to describe being.
32
 
§4 Causality and the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects 
Even though the transition between statements of different type amounts to a 
qualitative jump, since it is in each case a modification of the kind of invariance that the 
statements express, the consideration of the causality principle entails a much more radical 
move. The causality principle is neither a metaphysical statement about the world in itself, 
nor an empirical statement about the sensible world, like those we have discussed so far. 
The causality principle does not talk about objects, but rather about our knowledge of 
objects and it is in this sense a transcendental principle.
33
 More precisely, the principle is a 
statement about our empirical knowledge of objects and, thus, about the statements of 
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measurement results, about the statements of laws and about the statements of principles. 
According to Cassirer, the causality principle declares that all these statements “can be so 
related and combined with one another that from this combination there results a system of 
physical knowledge and not a mere aggregate of isolated observations.”34 In other words, 
the causality principle states that the conversion of sensible data into measurement results, 
their ordering according to laws and the unification of the multiplicity of these laws under 
principles is always possible. Thereby, even though such a process of systematization can 
never be considered as complete, its achievement should be sought as if an ultimate system 
were possible, by assuming that natural phenomena do not resist being systematically 
ordered. 
Therefore, Cassirer understands the causality principle in a transcendental sense, as a 
condition of the possibility of scientific knowledge, but he ascribes to it a meaning that 
does not coincide with the Kantian one. According to Kant, the causality principle is 
constitutive for the possibility of experience, in so far as it makes the distinction between 
the subjective series of perceptions and the objective series of experience first possible. For 
Cassirer, the causality principle has instead a regulative character,
35
 guiding our 
understanding towards the systematic unity of experience.
36
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Kant distinguishes the necessary task of three different cognitive faculties, which cooperate 
in knowledge: sensibility, understanding and reason. Sensibility provides us with intuitions. 
Understanding synthesizes these intuitions by means of concepts and thereby refers them to 
an object. Reason brings about the systematic unity of such objective cognitions. “Thus,” 
Kant declares, “all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to 
concepts, and ends with ideas.”37 From this viewpoint, the subsumption of spatio-temporal 
objects under concepts is the problem that the theory of schematism deals with. Schemata 
are precisely those representations that enable the spatio-temporal objects given by sensible 
intuitions to be thought by the concepts of understanding.  
 
Cassirer, in contradistinction to Kant, does not pose the problem in terms of cognitive 
faculties, since in that way the danger of psychologism seems unavoidable.
38
 The problem 
of the coordination between concepts and spatio-temporal objects is not that of the 
heterogeneity between intellectual concepts and sensible appearances.
39
 Cassirer rather 
assumes a transcendental perspective from which there is just one single objectifying 
function. In this regard, Cassirer indicates: “According as the function of objectivity, which 
is unitary in its purpose and nature, is realized in different empirical material, there arise 
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different concepts of physical reality; yet these latter only represent different stages in the 
fulfillment of the same fundamental demand.”40 The transcendental task of each Kantian 
faculty is thereby reinterpreted as a different moment of fulfillment of that unitary 
function.
41
 The statements of measurement results provide us with spatio-temporal data that 
are to be brought under rules expressed by statements of laws, the unity of which is attained 
by statements of principles.  
 
However, since “in all scientific knowledge laws precede objects,” Cassirer stresses that no 
object is „given‟ to us “other than through laws.”42 Thus, the Kantian distinction between 
the sensible conditions under which objects are given in intuition and the intellectual 
conditions under which objects are thought by means of laws cannot be maintained any 
more. The data for objective knowledge, the “statements of the first level,” cannot be 
isolated from statements of higher order as if “there would always be the possibility of 
imagining the higher layers removed without destroying the bottom layer or even altering it 
essentially.”43 To the contrary, “everything significantly factual is already theory.”44   
According to Cassirer, each type of statement expresses a peculiar moment of the 
conformity to law demanded by the causality principle. More precisely, each moment 
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corresponds to a certain order of logical invariance. In this way, concepts and spatio-
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